CNSC welcomes feedback on any regulatory document at any time REGDOC- supersedes RD, Design of New Nuclear Power. CNSC has issued its Fukushima report – posted on the CNSC website on that the design intent complies with CNSC design requirements (RD, RD-. Re: The Approvals Process for New Reactors in Canada – RD & RD ( CNSC) request for feedback on the comments received on the.
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Confinement A continuous boundary without openings or penetrations such as windows that prevents the transport of gases or particulates out of the enclosed space.
Conservative design measures and sound engineering practices are to be applied in the design basis for normal operation, AOOs, and DBAs. Designand the adaptation of those principles to align with Canadian practices. For extreme events, there is at least one cns of reactor shutdown and core cooling. Rd-337 assist in the establishment of design criteria for information display and controls, each operator is considered to have dual roles-that of a systems manager, including responsibility for accident management, and that of an equipment operator.
Rc-337 least one of the two isolation valves is either automatic or powered, and operable from the main and secondary control rooms. Events that may result from other events, such as a flood following an earthquake, are considered to be part of the original Rd3-37. In addition, the design ccnsc for an exclusion zone.
This includes provision of appropriate permanent layout and shielding of SSCs containing radioactive materials, and the use of temporary shielding for maintenance and inspection work. An important aspect of implementing defence-in-depth in the NPP design is the provision of a series of physical barriers to confine radioactive material at specified locations.
The design and the design process ensure compliance with the obligations arising from the safeguards agreement between Canada and the IAEA.
RD Design of New Nuclear Power Plants – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission
Early in the design process, the various potential barriers to core degradation are identified, and features that can be incorporated to halt core degradation at those barriers are considered.
The design includes provisions to ensure that the sharing of instruments does not result in an increased frequency in demand on the safety system during operation. Threats from credible malevolent acts are referred to as DBTs.
The design provides systems to control the release of fission products, hydrogen, oxygen, and other substances into the reactor containment as necessary, to:.
The design limits reflect the importance of preserving the cladding and fuel matrix, as these are the first barriers to fission product release. These include hardwired display panels as well as computerized displays that are as user friendly as possible. The subset of external events that the plant is designed to withstand is selected, and design basis events are determined from this subset. For this means of shutdown, a transient recriticality may be permitted in exceptional circumstances if the specified fuel and component limits are not exceeded.
Seismic fragility levels should be evaluated for SSCs important to safety by analysis or, where possible, by testing.
RD-337: Design of New Nuclear Power Plants
The revised requirements and new guidance also take into account findings from a benchmarking rd337, which compared RD against the design requirements of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Finland and the Western European Regulators Association to identify differences in objective, scope and level of detail. This approach includes verification at each step of the development process to demonstrate that the respective product is correct, and validation to demonstrate that the resulting computer-based system or equipment meets its functional and performance requirements.
Cabling for the instrumentation and csc equipment in the SCR is such that a fire in the main control room cannot disable the equipment in the SCR. SSCs important to safety are of proven designs, and are designed according cncs the standards and codes identified for the NPP.
The design provides means of reactor shutdown capable of reducing reactor power to a low value, and maintaining that power for the required duration, when the reactor power control system and the inherent characteristics are insufficient or incapable of maintaining reactor power within the requirements of the OLCs. The valves are normally arranged with one inside and one outside the containment structure.
Application of ncsc margins applies to access openings, penetrations, and isolation valves, and to the containment heat removal system. The design addresses the potential for accidents to occur when the availability of safety systems may be reduced, such as during shutdown, start-up, low power operation, refuelling, and maintenance.
Provision is also made to support timely detection of, and manual response to, conditions where prompt action is not necessary.
The reliability model for each system uses realistic failure criteria and best estimate failure rates, considering the anticipated demand on the system from PIEs. This approach identifies the need for dnsc functions as reactor shutdown, emergency core cooling, containment, emergency heat removal, and power systems, etc.
The design provides two independent means of preventing recriticality from any pathway or mechanism during the GSS. The inventory in the reactor coolant system and its associated systems are sufficient to support cool down from hot operating conditions to zero power cold conditions without the need for transfer from any other systems. Common-cause failure A concurrent failure of two or more structures, systems or components due to a single specific event or cause, such as natural phenomena earthquakes, tornadoes, floods, etc.
The emergency power supply EPS system has sufficient capacity and reliability, within a rd3-37 mission time, to provide the necessary power to maintain the plant in a safe state and ensure nuclear safety in the event of all DBAs. Hazards analysis is the process of collecting and evaluating information about the NPP to identify the associated hazards and determine those that are significant and must be addressed.
The set of design basis accidents sets the boundary conditions according to which SSCs important to safety are designed. This applies to neutron flux in all regions of the core rd337 normal operation including after shutdown and during and after refuelling statesand during AOOs.
The NSCA and the technical safety objectives provide the basis for the following criteria and goals:.